Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

State of Utah v. Dennis Boyd Gardner : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert B. Hansen; Craig L. Barlow; Attorneys for Respondent;
Marlynn Bennett Lema; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Gardner, No. 15536 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/990

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

l-:f .•

STATE OF UTAH

i

~

-' ..-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15536

-vsDENNIS BOYD GARDNER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR CARBON
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
EDWARD SHEYA,JUDGE, PRESIDING

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General

J''

.....

-k,.... "' ,...

. ~:-t~
,

~._I

236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, -Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
MARLYNN BENNETT LEMA
52 North First West
P. 0. Box 1026
Price, Utah 84501
Attorney for Appellant

FILED
APR 10 1978

-----··---

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

j

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE--------------- 1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT------------------------ 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL--------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS-------------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY
RESTRICTED CROS EXAMINATION OF A
STATE'S WITNESS CONCERNING A PRIOR
CHARGE OF FALSE STATEMENT AND ITS
ATTENDANT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS---------- 3
POINT II: APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF
ERROR DUE TO IMPROPER CLOSING REMARKS IS NOT REVIE\vABLE BY THIS
COURT SINCE CLOSING REMARKS WERE
NOT MADE PART OF THE PRESENT RECORD----- 11
POINT .III: RESPONDENT ADMITS THAT
PHENTERMINE IS NOT A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND APPELLANT'S CONVICTION ON
TWO COUNTS INVOLVING PHENTERMINE
--------SHOULD BE VOID-------------------------- 11
CONCLUSION---------------------------------------- 12
CASES CITED
Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338
(1939)---------------------------------- 11
People v. Mackey, 58 Cal. App. 123, 208 Pac.
135 (Calif. 1922)----------------------- 5
State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977)-------- 12,13
State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229
(1936)---------------------------------- 9,10
State v. Mcintyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879,
88 (1937)------------------------------- 10
STATUTES CITED
Ann.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

California Code, Section 1203.4 (Supp. 1978)- 5-7
Code Ann. §58-37-3(2)------------------------ 12
Code Ann. §58-37-4--------------------------- 12
Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1953)---------- 1
Code Ann. §77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1977)----------- 7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-i- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Continued

Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Utah Rules of Evidence----------------------------

4,7,8,12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-iiMachine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,:

Case No. 15536

-vsDENNIS BOYD GARDNER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with three counts of distribution of controlled substance for value in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii)

(1953).

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of three counts of distribution of controlled substances for
value (two counts for phentermine, one count for marijuana),
on September 8, and 9, 1977, in the District Court in and
for Carbon County, Utah, the Honorable Edward Sheya presiding.
On November 9, 1977, appellant was sentenced for each of the
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three counts; to 1) three years probation, 2) 90 days in
jail and 3) ordered to repay the county for attorney fees
that had been encurred in his defense.

The three sentences

were to be served concurrently with only one restitution of
attorney fees being required

(R.73).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and
judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Barry Becker was working as a Reg ion 8 Narcot:
Task Force undercover agent during December of 1976 (T .14).
In that capacity, he met appellant in the Point After Bar
in Helper, Utah, on December 1, 1976 (T.l6).

Appellant offE

to sell Mr. Becker some "cartwheels," the street name for
amphetamines (T.l6).

After some negotiations, Mr. Becker q

appellant twenty-five dollars in exchange for a bag of twen·
amphetamines (T .17) .
ing night.

A similar incident occurred the follo;

Becker met appellant elsewhere and then they dr

to the Point After Bar where Hr. Becker again exchanged t1>e
dollars for a bag of pills represented to be twenty
amphetamines (T.21-22).
On December 7, 19 7 6, Hr. Becker was in the No Na:
Bar when appellant offered to sell him a "lid" of marijuan'
(T.24-25).

In exchange for ten dollars, Mr.

Becker recei

a baggie from appellant, proportedly containing marijuana
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Bruce Beck, toxicologist for the Utah State
Department of Health (T.52) testified that his findings
indicated that the first two exhibits presented by the
State were Phentermine, a substance similar in effect to
amphetamines

(T.53-54).

Mr. Beck also verified that the

State's third exhibit was marijuana (T.SS).
ARGUHENT
POINT I
THE LO>vER COURT PROPERLY RESTRICTED CROSS EXAMINATION OF A STATE'S WITNESS CONCERNING A PRIOR CHARGE OF FALSE
STATEMENT AND ITS ATTENDANT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Prior to the presentation of any

evidence-the-tr:-:~i..:a:t-,llo---

court held a hearing regarding a motion in limini.

The Court

ascertained that Mr. Barry Becker, the State's chief witness,
had previously been charged with a misdemeanor crime involving
moral turpitude in California (T.9).

Evidence presented by

the State showed that Mr. Barry Becker had fulfilled his
probation and the court, pursuant to statute, allowed him
to withdraw his guilty plea, enter a plea of not guilty, dismissed the Information involved and released him from "all
penalty and disability therefrom"

(T.6).

After full discussion of this matter the court
determined that it would be improper to allow appellant to
cross-examine Mr. Becker concerning these previous judicial
proceedings and directed her not to do so (T.l3).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Appellant argues that questioning about addition,
details of this charge should have been allowed to impeach
Mr. Becker's testimony by demonstrating he \vas a dishonest
person.

Respondent submits that this argument is not

supported by the facts of the case nor the current state
of the law.
Appellant focuses on Rule 21 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence in support of his argument.

Rule 21 reads:

"Evidence of the conviction of
a witness for a crime not involving
dishonesty or false statement shall
be inadmissible for the purpose of
impairing his credibility, except
as otherwise provided by statute."
Even assuming, arguendo, that appellant is correct in his
assertion that this rule would allow evidence of a
misdemeanor conviction involving dishonesty or false state·
ment

to be presented for impeachment pur.poses,1

J:esponder

submits that this rule would not be applicable in the
present case.

Respondent asserts that the proceedings

against Mr. Becker in California did not consti tut:e a conviction for purposes of this Rule.

1

Respondent has found no judicial
the scope of this rule. Whether
to evidence of felony conviction
evidence is also included within
an unsettled question.

interpretation as to
the rule applies onlY
or whether misdemeano:
the rule seems to be
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The statute under which Mr. Becker's charge was
dismissed is Ann. California Code, Section 1203.4 (Supp.
1978).

It reads in relevant part:
"(a)
In any cases in which a
defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire
period of probation, or has been
discharged prior to the termination
of the period of probation. • • the
defendant shall, at any time after
the termination of the period of
probation, if he is not then serving
a sentence for any offense, on
probation for any offense, or charged
with the commission of any offense,
be permitted by the court to withdra'I'T
his plea of guilty • • • and enter a
plea of not guilty; • • • and, • • •
the court shall thereupon dismiss the
accusations or information against the
defendant and he shall thereafter be
released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense
of which he has been convicted • • • • "
The California District Appeals Court determined

the effect that the forerunner of this statute would have on
the admissibility of impeaching evidence in the case of
People v. Mackey, 58 Cal.App. 123, 208 Pac. 135 (Calif. 1922).
In that case a principal witness against the defendant had
been charged with a felony and had pled guilty.

Under a

procedure identical to that expressed in Section 1203.4,
the court had dismissed the charge prior to the time he
was testifying as a witness.

The defendant sought to

introduce the record of this prior conviction for impeachment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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purposes, as was provided for by statute.

But: the trial

court sustained an objection to the offer of this
evidence.

In upholding the trial court, the Appeals

Court discussed the purpose and legislative intent of
the statute in question:
"Of course, after a dismissal
in such a situation, the defendant
involved, if not still a convicted
felon, remains in a practical sense
one who has been convicted of a
felony. We cannot avoid the
conclusion, however, that the Legislature intended in a legal sense by
directing a dismissal under such
circumstances, to wipe out absolutely
the entire proceeding in question
in a given case, and to place the
defendant in the position which
he would have occupied in all respects
as a citizen if no accusation or
information had ever been presented
against him. Such is the legal effect
of the dismissal of a criminal charge
before conviction, and we are convinced
that the lawmaking body intended, by
section 1203, that the same effect
should attend a dismissal after conviction • • • On the whole, we conclude that
the Legislature intended by the enactment of section 1203 that no convicted
person discharged after probation
thenceforth should be regarded as one
possessed of the degree of turpitude
likely to affect his credibility as
a witness." Id. at 138.
This holding in Mackey makes clear that the
California courts would not have allowed any further
evidence concerning Mr. Becker's dismissed conviction to
be admitted had this case been before a court of that
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state.

The reasoning of the Califronia court in Mackey was

valid and logical and therefore should be applied by Utah
courts.

The similar intent of the Utah legislature to free

people of certain disabilities relating to prior convictions
is expressed in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1977):
"(1) (a) Any person who has been
convicted of any crime within this state
may petition the convicting court for
a judicial pardon and for the expungement
of his record in that court • • •
(b) If the court finds that the peti~
tioner, for a period of five years in the
case of a class A misdemeanor or felony, or
for a period of one year in the caseof __________
other misdemeanors, since his release from
incarceration or probation, has not been
convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude and that no
proceeding involving such a crime is
pending or being instituted against the
petitioner and, further, finds that the
rehabilitation of the petitioner has been
attained to the satisfaction of the court,
i t shall enter an order that all records
in the petitioner's case in the custody
of that court or in the custody of any
other court, agency or official be
sealed. • •
(c) Upon the entry of the order in
those proceedings, the pet1tioner shall be
deemed judicially pardoned and the petitioner
may thereafter respond to any inquiries
relating to convictions of crimes as though
that conviction never occurred."
(Emphasis
The important rehabilitative purpose of the above
statute outweighs any need for a technical application of
Rule 21.

Respondent submits this type of proceeding, which
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ends with a plea of not guilty being entered and the
charges being dismissed is noi- within the purview of
"conviction" evidence which the legislature intends to
be utilized for impeachment purposes.
is inapplicable in the

prese~'

Rule 21 therefore

case.

Further, evidence of the prior criminal
proceedings involving Mr. Becker would not be admissible
under the more general Rules of Evidence relating to
impeaching evidence.
Rule 22 establishes specific limitations on
the admissibility of evidence affecting credibility.
It reads, in relevant part:
"(c) [E]vidence of traits of
(a witness') character other than
truth, honesty and integrity or
their opposites, shall be inadmissible;
(d) evidence of specific instances of
his conduct relevant only as tending to
prove a trait of his character, shall be
inadmissible."
Although this rule impliedly permits evidence as
to the truth, honesty and integrity (or their opposites)
of a witness, such evidence cannot take the form of
specific instances of conduct.

Rules 46 and 47 reveal

that evidence of a bad character trait must take the fom
of opinion or evidence of reputation.

The only evidence

of specific conduct allowed under these rules is evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
of conviction
of anda Technology
crime;
an exception
is inapplicar
Library Services
Act, administered
by the Utah Statewhich
Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the present case.
Since evidence concerning these prior judicial
proceedings against Mr. Becker would have been inadmissible
under the Rules of Evidence i t was properly excluded by the
trial court.
This conclusion is also supported by pre-Rule
case law.

In State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229

(1936), a case heavily relied on by appellant, this
Court established several principles to help guide the
"bench and bar."

Principle number eight, which was

omitted by appellant, is directly applicable in the
present case:
"Where the questions of the
cross-examiner call for isolated or
sporadic acts or conduct directly
tending to degrade the witness, or
show moral turpitude, whether they
would tend to subject the witness
to punishment for.a felony or not,
but which could not be said to mark
the witness as one of lmv or dissolute
character and which do not present
any reasonable basis for an assumption
that the witness was not telling the
truth in the case, objection on the
ground of irrelevancy and incompetency
should be sustained." Id. at 238.
This principle enunciates the balancing approach
that the court found necessary when dealing with
of specific conduct.

evidence

The prior specific conduct which

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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apparently involved false statement was totally unrelated
in time or place to the testimony which the witness
presented in the present case.

It could not lead to any

assumptions about the present testimony and one prior act
does not establish that Mr. Becker is of "low and dissolutr
character."

The trial court's sustaining of the State's

objection to questioning of this specific act: complied
with this principle of Hougensen.
Lastly, prior case law establishes that the
extent of any cross-examination as to specific acts for
purpose of credibility is within the sound

discrc~tion

of

the trial court.
"As to other matters affecting
the witness' morality or violations
of law, the field of cross-examination
is largely within the sound discretion
of the trial court and \¥ill not be
disturbed except in cases of clear
abuse of that discretion.
State v.
Hougensen (cite omitted." State v.
Mcintyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879, 888
(1937).
The trial court gave considerable time for the d:
cussion of this point at trial and had previously studied
briefs prepared by counsel

(T.l2-13).

His preclusion cif

questioning of Mr. Becker as to the prior California

I'

pro~

was a rational omission of inadmissable evidence and shoul
Sponsoredsustained
by the S.J. Quinney Law
Funding for digitization
provided by theof
Institute
of Museum
and Library
Services
as Library.
a proper
application
the
trial
court's
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT II
APPELLANT'S CLAIH OF ERROR DUE TO H1PROPER CLOSING REMARKS IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THIS COURT SINCE CLOSING
REMARKS WERE NOT HADE PART OF THE PRESENT RECORD.
Appellant moved for a mistrial based on allegations
of improper closing remarks by the respondent.

The trial

court reviewed the question and determined that counsel for
the State had not exceeded proper limits in his closing
argument. (T.71-72).

Except for this indirect reference

to closing remarks the transcript is silent as to the content
of these remarks.

Respondent has been told by the recorder

in this case that the verbal arguments were not recoraed-.----Only a note as to when they occurred is present in the transcript

(T.70).
This Court can only review matters of record before

it.

Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338 (1939).

Therefore, any review of non-recorded closing arguments would
be improper.
POINT III
RESPONDENT ADMITS THAT PHENTERJv!INE IS NOT A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND APPELLANT'S CONVICTION ON TWO COUNTS
INVOLVInG PHENTERMINE SHOULD BE VOID.
Phentermine is one of many substances which was
added to the legislative list of controlled substances by

-11- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Attorney General under the power granted by Utah Code
Ann. §58-37-3(2).

However, s1nce this Court has recently

determined this power was an unconstitutional deligation, in
State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683

(Utah, 1977), respondent con-

cedes that the conviction of appellant for the two counts of
distribution of phentermine for value was improper and should
be reversed.
It is important to note, however, that appellant wu
also convicted of distribution of marijuana for value.

This

substance is listed in Utah Code Ann. §58-37-4, under Schedule
I(iii) (J), on the original legislative list of controlled

su~
I

stances and is, therefore, uneffected by the ruling in Gallion~
Appellant's sentence for this conviction of 1) three year probation, 2) 90 days in jail and 3) restitution for attorney

f~

should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Detailed information about previous judicial proceedings against a witness was not proper evidence for impea&
ment purposes since the proceedings had ultimately

conclud~

with a plea of not guilty being entered, the charges being
dismissed and the witness being relieved of criminal "disabilities."

Such proceedings do not constitute a "conviction"

within the purpose or meaning of Rule 21.

Neither is such

evidence admissible to demonstrate a bad character trait sucl

-12-
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it is not reputation evidence.

The trial court properly

excluded any questioning in this regard.

And, since there

is no transcript of closing arguments any alleged error of
the prosecutor in his closing statement is not reviev1able
by this court.
Respondent concedes that phentermine is not a
controlled substance under the holding in Gallion and, therefore, respondent does not oppose reversal on counts I and II.
However, for the above-mentioned reasons, respondent
contends that the conviction involving marijuana was proper
and, therefore, respectfully submits that the judgment and
sentence of the lower court on Count III of the

amended~~·

_ _ __

complaint be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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